Migrants’ Attitudes towards Welfare State Access

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Introduction

- What do immigrants think about the welfare state?
  - Especially, what do they think about the access of immigrants?
    - Do their opinions differ from natives’ opinions?
    - What drives their opinion?
State of Research

- Welfare Chauvinism: Attitudes to be in favor of welfare, but also prefer to restrict it to our own (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990)
- Only studied among natives (one exception: Kolbe and Crepaz, 2015)
- Research on Welfare Chauvinism among Natives found
  - Demographics: Sex (+/-); Age (+); Marital Status (+); Unemployed/Welfare Dependency (+/-)
  - Resources: Education (-); Income (-)
  - Share of immigrants (+/0)
  - Welfare State Generosity (-)

(Appelbaum, 2002; Bay and Pedersen, 2006; Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Hjorth, 2015; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Oorschot, 2008; Oorschot and Uunk, 2007; Raijman et al. 2003; Reeskens and Oorschot, 2012; Waal et al. 2010, 2013)
State of Research

- Research on Migrants’ Political and Welfare State Attitudes found
  - Immigrants tend to be rather pro welfare compared to natives
  - Immigrants are also less restrictive when it comes to migration and to welfare state access, but they also become more similar to natives, once they acquired the citizenship
  - Preference for redistribution endures into second generation

(Dancygier and Saunders, 2006; Just and Anderson, 2015; Kolbe and Crepaz, 2015; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Reeskens and Oorschot, 2015)
Theoretical Background

- Differences between immigrants and natives
  - Migration motives: Selective migration due to ”welfare magnetism”(Borjas, 1999; Razin and Wahba, 2015)
  - Self-Interest: more often in vulnerable positions (Barrett and McCarthy, 2008)
  - Group-loyalty: loyal to immigrants

- Integration effect due to new institutions and contacts (adaption and learning)
  - Over generations (Diehl et al. 2009; Maxwell, 2010; Reeskens and Oorschot, 2015)
  - Over length of residence (Röder, 2014)
Theoretical Background

- **Self-Interest (First generation immigrants)**
  - Like natives, we expect immigrants to look at their own situation (Andreß and Heien, 2001; Funk, 2000; Jæger, 2006)
  - They are influenced by their individual states, so immigrants favor a level of restrictiveness that corresponds:
    - After 1 year: lived in the country for more than a year
    - Taxes: worked and paid taxes for at least a year
    - Citizenship: acquired the citizenship
    - Never: if they do not at all fear the risk to become dependent on social benefits
Dataset and Operationalization

- Dataset: ESS 2008
- 25,466 observations
  - 21,719 Natives
  - 1,838 Second Generation Immigrants
  - 1,909 First Generation Immigrants
- 20 Countries
  - Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, and the United Kingdom
Dependent Variable: When should immigrants obtain the right to receive social benefits?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Immediately</th>
<th>Residence 1yr</th>
<th>Paid Taxes 1yr</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>1,576 (7%)</td>
<td>1,986 (9%)</td>
<td>8,710 (40%)</td>
<td>7,993 (37%)</td>
<td>1,454 (7%)</td>
<td>21,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Gen.</td>
<td>175 (10%)</td>
<td>183 (10%)</td>
<td>799 (43%)</td>
<td>597 (32%)</td>
<td>84 (5%)</td>
<td>1,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Gen.</td>
<td>328 (17%)</td>
<td>249 (13%)</td>
<td>904 (47%)</td>
<td>387 (20%)</td>
<td>41 (2%)</td>
<td>1,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,079 (8%)</td>
<td>2,418 (9%)</td>
<td>10,413 (41%)</td>
<td>8,977 (35%)</td>
<td>1,579 (6%)</td>
<td>25,466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Controls: age, sex, income (standardized), education (ISCED), welfare dependency, marital status, pro redistribution, anti-immigrants attitudes
- Statistical Model: Multinomial Logit Models with Random Intercepts (country)
Results

- Comparison of immigrants and natives
Results

- Length of Residence

When should migrants receive social benefits

- 1 Year Arrival
  - Second Gen.
  - 20+ years
  - 1-20 years
  - 6-10 years
  - last 5yr

- 1 Year paid taxes
  - Second Gen.
  - 20+ years
  - 1-20 years
  - 6-10 years
  - last 5yr

- Citizenship
  - Second Gen.
  - 20+ years
  - 1-20 years
  - 6-10 years
  - last 5yr

- Never
  - Second Gen.
  - 20+ years
  - 1-20 years
  - 6-10 years
  - last 5yr

n=25466; II-Model=-31875.8
Complete Sample; Reference: immediately after arrival
Mlogit Random Intercepts for Country
Results

- Self-Interest Model (First Generation Immigrants)
Conclusion

- we studied the restrictiveness of immigrants with respect to welfare state access
  - Integration over generations, but not with the length of residence
  - Self-Interest tends to play a role especially for those with citizenship and tax payers (those who succeeded?)
- Unfortunately we lack measures to test
  - effects of socialization of country of birth
  - whether their attitudes are driven by group-loyalty controlled for self-interest (and vice versa)
- furthermore: sample size, not focused on immigrants
Next Steps

- Collection of new Dataset "MIFARE"
  - attitudes of and towards immigrants (Welfare State, politics etc.)
  - questions based on existing datasets (ISSP, ESS) + expansion
  - country comparison: Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark
  - different immigrant groups with 200-350 observations per group (German dataset: over 2700 total observations)
  - focused on immigrants who migrated themselves (socialized in country of origin)
Thank you
References


References III


